COMPUTERS AND PRIVACY: A PROPOSAL
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In framing the issues in its landmark Computer Inquiry, the
Federal Communications Commission cited the critical importance
of the preservation of information privacy:
Privacy, particularly in the area of communications, is a well established
policy and objective of the Communications Act. Thus, any threatened or
potential invasion of privacy is cause for concern by the Commission and the
industry. In the past, the invasion of information privacy was rendered
difficult by the scattered and random nature of individual data. Now the
fragmentary nature of information is becoming a relic of the past. Data
centers and common memory drums housing competitive sales, inventory and
credit information and untold amounts of personal information, are
becoming common. This personal and proprietary information must remain
free from unauthorized invasion or disclosure, whether at the computer, the
terminal station, or the interconnecting communication link.

Congress, too, has demonstrated an increasing concern with the
possible threats to individual privacy which might result from the
establishment, by the federal government or by private industry, of
a national data bank? In fact Paul Baran of Rand Corporation,
testifying several years ago before a congressional subcommittee,
stated that the United States is unconsciously moving toward an
integrated, nationwide; automated information system:
My thesis is this: Today we are already building the bits and pieces of
separate automated information systems in both the private and government
sectors that so closely follow the pattern to the present integrated
communications structure that a de facto version of the system you are now
pondering is already into the construction phase. It is in many ways more
dangerous than the single data bank now being considered
Although the threat posed by automated information systems to

the privacy of individuals is perhaps the most dramatic aspect of the
* Member, District of Columbia Bar. B.A. 1954, Manhattan College; LL.B. 1959, Harvard
Law School.
1. FCC Notice of Inquiry, Docket, No. 16979,7 F.C.C.2d 1i, 16-17,8 P & F RADIO REG.
2d 1567, 1572 (Nov. 9, 1966) [hereinafter cited as Computer Inquiry].
2. See generally Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy Before a Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Gallagher Hearings]; Note, Privacy and Efficient Government: Proposals for a National Data
Center, 82 HARV. L. REv. 400 (1968); Research Project- Computerization of Government
Files, What Impact on the Individual, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1371 (1968).
3. Gallagher Hearings 122.
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"computer revolution," another very important aspect is the
possibility of unauthorized disclosure of proprietary data. The
"privacy problem" in both of these contexts is most acute where the
separate proprietary data of a large number of businesses or sensitive
personal information about thousands of individuals is stored or
processed in multi-programmed, time-sharing data processing
systems and transmitted to and from the processing and storage
units over common communications lines. In such systems, there
exists at numerous points a high potential for "information
leakage," including leakage due to hardware and software failures
and wire taps
In addition to examining both of these aspects of the privacy
problem from the point of view of the computer system operator,
this article proposes the establishment of a logical legal framework
which would serve the public interest by assuring, first, that
computer systems which handle sensitive individual or proprietary
data will meet certain minimum standards established for the
protection of privacy, and, second, that computer system operators
will be able to continue to operate in a competitive economy
unhindered by either overly restrictive governmental regulation or
the fear of private legal liability. The analysis and suggestions herein
set forth are relevant to all types of computer systems which store
information or use computer programs belonging to persons or
entities other than the computer system operator or which collect
and store information about private individuals
The computer industry, which when viewed in its broadest
significance extends from manufacturers of main frame hardware to
computer service bureaus and computerized information services,
should now cooperate with the communications industry to adopt
4. See Ware, Security and Privacy in Computer Systems, PROCEEDINGS, 1967 SPRING

JOINT COMPUTER CONFERENCE 279, 280 figure 1. Effective protection of both individual
privacy and proprietary data also demands control over the amount and character of the data
input entering the system. See Miller, Personal Privacy in the ComputerAge: The Challenge
of a New Technology in an Information-OrientedSociety, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1214-17,
1229-30 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Miller]. Regulation of data input is beyond the scope of

this article which is directed solely to controls in the storage and utilization of the data
previously collected.
5. An obvious example of the latter is the automated credit bureau. Credit Data

Corporation maintains a large scale, on-line computerized credit information system with data
centers located in Los Angeles and New York City. Response of Credit Data Corp. to FCC
Computer Inquiry, March 5, 1968.See generally Miller 1140-54.
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and implement, under the auspices of the federal government, a

comprehensive system of self-regulation to ensure the privacy and
security of data. As a corollary of such a scheme, computer systems
complying with the established standards6 should be freed from
certain types of civil legal liability for the unauthorized or accidental
divulgence of individual or proprietary information.
THE PRESENT LEGAL SITUATION:

A STUDY IN UNCERTAINTY

For the purpose of analyzing the present legal controls pertinent
to privacy and the computer, it will be helpful to consider a few

illustrative situations:
1. Computer service company A operates a multi-programmed, timesharing, remote-access data processing system. It services 25 customers
scattered over a wide area, each with at least one remote terminal device.
Each of A's customers stores at least one proprietary program and a good
deal of data in A's system. Companies X and Y are competitors and are both
customers of A. Let us suppose that company X has been able to obtain
confidential data belonging to Y at X's remote terminal.
2. Assume the same basic set of facts with the exception that A has 500
customers, most of which are very small.
3. Company A runs a computerized information service containing
personal data about thousands of individuals, including credit data, medical
data, employment data, and educational data. A offers this service to
carefully selected classes of subscribers, each of whom promises to use the
information for only circumscribed and legitimate purposes. Company A's
subscribers are linked to its computer system by remote terminal. Mr. X, a
nonsubscriber, manages to tap into company A's system and connect an
unauthorized remote terminal, thereby gathering information about a number
of individuals. The information so obtained is used in an article which he
publishes in a national magazine.
4. Assume the same facts as in example 3, except that a programmer6. See notes 54-61 infra and accompanying text.
7. This paper does not deal with the problems presented by the voluntary disclosure by the
system operators of private information about individuals stored in computer systems or
questions relating to the accuracy of information about individuals contained in such systems.
For discussions of some of the problems involved in the storage of inaccurate information
about individuals and the voluntary disclosure of information about individuals, whether
accurate or inaccurate, by the custodians of such information, see Karst, "The Files": Legal
Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored PersonalData, 31 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 342 (1966); Sills, Automated Data Processing and the Issue of Privacy, I SETON
HALL' L. REv. 7 (1970); Note, Credit Investigations and the Right to Privacy: Quest fo'r
a
Remedy, 57 GEo. L.J. 509 (1969).
8. What constitutes "legitimate" voluntary disclosure of information by the information
service company is beyond the scope of this paper. See note 7 supra.
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employee of company A, without authority, extracts information about some
individual from the system and sells such information to Mr. X.

Although the number of possible variations is almost without limit,
these four examples are sufficient to illustrate some of the difficulties
which computer service companies may face.
From the point of view of the computer service company, the
first two examples present issues of contractual or, possibly, tort
liabilityY The customer whose proprietary data has been obtained
without authority by some third party might well have a claim for
breach of contract against the computer service company. However,
the results in such a situation can be quite diverse. If the computer
service company is dealing with large, sophisticated customers,
service contacts are likely to be thorough and well-defined,
specifying with detail the degree of privacy and security of data
promised by the company and expected by its customer. On the
other hand, if the computer service company's customers are small
and perhaps less sophisticated, the contract between them may tend
to be of the boiler plate variety and may not contain provisions
adequate to protect the privacy and security of data. But
uncertainty, rather than a complete absence of protection, is more
likely to be the case. 0 Unfortunately, the outcome in any specific
situation will depend upon the prevailing business practices and
governing standards in the state involved.
Examples 3 and 4 squarely raise the issue of the extent to which
an individual's "right of privacy" will be afforded legal protection."
Although most privacy cases involving the disclosure of individual
information are likely to arise as tort actions, situations could arise
in which an individual might have a claim based upon the law of
contract. For example, assume that a computer service company
enters into a contract with company X to store personal data
concerning some one thousand employees of X and to furnish the
data to X upon request. Assume further that the contract includes
specific provisions for protecting the privacy of the individuals
involved. If the computer company breaches the contract by
9. See generally Miller 1156-73.
10. See Lickson, Protection of the Privacy of Data Communications by Contract: Another
Case Study on the Impact of Computer Technology on the Law, Bus. LAW, July 1968, at

979-80.
II. Under certain variations of these examples, the contractual rights of the computer

service company's customer may also be involved.
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allowing information to fall into the hands of a third person who
uses it to the injury of the employees, the injured employee might
seek recovery against the computer service company as a third party

beneficiary of the computer service contract.
In most situations, however, an individual's claim that his
privacy had been violated would have to be founded upon the tort
of invasion of or interference with privacy. Although of relatively

recent judicial recognition, 3 this tort has developed to the point
where one noted commentator has been able to discern the existence

of four separate torts under the rubric "invasion of privacy":" (1)
unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another or into his
private affairs;

5

(2) appropriation of an individual's name or

likeness;" (3) unreasonable publicity given to another's private life,
or public disclosure of a private fact about an individual;17 and (4)
publicity which places another in a false light in the public eye."
The tort doctrine regarding the protection of privacy, in its
present state of development, quite possibly would not provide a
basis for a finding of liability against the computer service company
in either example 3 or 4, where we have assumed that the computer

company took no deliberate action to injure the plaintiff. However,
the law of privacy has developed in response to the changing
conditions of society, and the advent of the computer age is almost
certain to result in a further judicial expansion of the
doctrine-perhaps with legislative help.19 Although four states
12. See generally RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 133-47 (1932).

13. The Supreme Court of Georgia is considered to have laid the foundation for recognition
of a right to privacy as a fundamental, legally protectible interest in Pavesich v. New England
Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68, 69-70 (1905). Of course, the intellectual foundation
for recognition of invasion of privacy as a separate tort had been laid in Warren & Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy,4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
14. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. LAw 383, 389 (1960).
15. See, e.g., Le Crone v. Ohio Bell Tel.Co., 120 Ohio App. 129, 201 N.E.2d 533 (1963)
(wiretapping of an individual's telephone).
16. See, e.g., Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938) (photograph
of an actress used in a bread advertisement).
17. See, e.g., Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927) (sign in garage window
stating that the plaintiff's account with the garage has been unpaid for a long time).
18. See, e.g., Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948) (newspaper
article on the alleged practices of Washington cab drivers in cheating the public on fares,
making use of the plaintiff's photograph to illustrate the article).
19. For example, Congress is now considering legislation which would regulate the activities
of credit bureaus and credit investigating agencies, a field in which the computer has been
playing an ever-increasing role. S. 823, 91st Cong., ist Sess. (1969); H.R. 7874, 91st Cong.,
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apparently still reject the right of privacy in its entirety, 20 judicial
2
expansion of the doctrine continues. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 1
for example, the Supreme Court seemed to find, in a context quite
far removed from the fourth amendment prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures, a constitutionally protected right
of privacy inherent in several amendments.P
Of special significance is the recent New York decision in Nader
v. General Motors Corp.,2 which extended the Griswold rationale

prohibiting the violation of a constitutional right to privacy to
invasions by a private corporation, not the state. The court
implicitly found that state inaction-the refusal by the state court
to entertain a lawsuit alleging a violation by the corporation of the
plaintiff's constitutional right to privacy-constituted sufficient
"state action" to invoke the protection of the fourteenth
amendment. If the holding in Nader survives, the implications for
the computer industry could be far-reaching?
There can be no doubt that the computer service industry,
dealing as it does with personal data on hundreds or thousands of
individuals, strongly affects the public interest U Indeed, against the
background of expanding computer services the need for a further
1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 9150, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 9888, 91st Cong., Ist Sess.
(1969). The Sen'ate passed S. 823 on Nov. 6, 1969, 115 CONG. REC. 13,905-11 (daily ed. Nov.

6, 1969) and reported it to the House Committee on Banking and Currency on Nov. 12, 1969.
Hearings have been held this spring before the House Committee.
20. These states are Nebraska, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wisconsin. REST^TEMENT

(SECo ND) oFToRTs, ch. 28A, at 100 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967).
21. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

22. See also Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966), where the Court pointed out that the
fifth amendment guarantee against self-incrimination is really in part an extension of an
individual's right to privacy and "our respect for the inviolability of the human personality
and of the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a private life.'"
Id. at414 n.12.

23. 57 Misc. 2d 301, 292 N.Y.S.2d 514 (Sup. Ct. 1968), affd, 298 N.Y.S.2d 137 (App.
Div. 1969).
24. Id. at 305, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 518.

25. The Appellate Division, in affirming the trial court's refusal to dismiss the case, held
that it need not pass upon the constitutional grounds advanced by the trial court. 298
N.Y.S.2d at 141. We shall have to await further litigation to test the implications of Nader.
26. See generally A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); GallagherHearings, supra
note 2; Pipe, Privacy: EstablishingRestrictions on Government Inquiry, 18 AM. U.L. REV.
516 (1969); Note, Credit Investigations and the Right to Privacy: Quest for a Remedy, 57
GEo. L.J. 509 (1969); Research Project--Computerizationof Government Files, What Impact
on the IndividuaP, 15 U.C L.A.L. REV. 1371, 1374-75 (1968) (foreword by Mr. Justice
Douglas).
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extension of the doctrine of right of privacy has been vigorously
asserted.27 Thus, one commentator has recently noted that "[tihe

concept of privacy held by most courts, considered revolutionary
during the Warren-Brandeis era, seems more fitted for the 19th

century rather than the 20th; a 'new privacy' must be formulated to
protect the individual from the technological advances of the
computer age." 2' Another commentator recently advanced the thesis
that the fifth amendment prohibition against the taking of private
property by the government without just compensation, applicable

to the states through the fourteenth amendment, should be extended
to a similar destruction or diminution of the right of individual
privacy? Furthermore, actions by large public corporations which
result in a diminution of an individual's privacy should be regarded
as equivalent to state action and therefore subject to the payment of
"just compensation." ' The growing tendency to extend the bounds
of privacy protection is thus manifest. 1 If, becaise of their vast
informational storage and ready access capabilities, computers and
computer systems become generally regarded as great potential

threats to the individual's right of privacy, it would not be surprising
to find courts holding computer service companies liable for the
27. Note, Credit Investigations and the Right to Privacy: Quest for a Remedy, 57 GEo.
L.J. 509 (1969).
28. Id. at 532.
29. Comment, Privacy, Property, Public Use, and Just Compensation, 41 S. CAL. L. REV.
902,909 (1968).
30. Id. at 913. The author's main point is made in the following statements:
It can be argued that all large public corporations, such as Time, Inc., whose activity
has as great a societal impact as does most governmental action, should be subject to
the same constitutional limitations as is the government. Their activity should be
labelled "public," rather than "private," in contradistinction to an individual's
activity .... In short, most corporations are, at least in part, fulfilling interests of the
state, and no longer fulfilling the traditional justifications of private property. In these
instances they ought to be subject to the same constitutional limitations as are imposed
upon the state. One of these limitations is that private property cannot be taken for a
public use without payment ofjust compensation. Id. at 913-14.
And, as noted, the author would equate the "right of privacy" to "private property" and
would require the payment of just compensation for any action which results in a destruction
or diminution of an individual's right of privacy.
31. The American Law Institute, in a tentative draft of a portion of a new Restatement of
Torts, commented that new forms of the tort of invasion of privacy in addition to the four
basic types already generally recognized by the courts may emerge, especially in light of recent
decisions by the United States Supreme Court. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A,
comment c (rent. Draft No. 13, 1967). See also Westin, Science. Privacy, and Freedom: Issues
and Proposalsfor the 1970's. Pt. 11: Balancing the Conflicting Demands of Privacy,
Disclosure,andSurveillance, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1205, 1232 (1966).
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unauthorized disclosure of information about an individual 2
Moreover, the court might go beyond the traditional concept that
the defendant must be guilty of an intentional or deliberate
wrongdoing in order to be held liable under an invasion of privacy
theory and hold computer companies liable for negligently
permitting an unauthorized release of information. Indeed, if the
information is sensitive enough and the damage from release is
devastating enough, a court might be tempted to dispense even with
the requirement of negligence and simply hold the computer
company absolutely liable for the unauthorized release? 3 Whether
the computer company's failure is technological 4 or human" should
make no difference.
The law usually has evolved to keep pace with changing social,
political, moral, and economic circumstances. For those who might
dismiss as "mere speculations" the above thoughts about the

possible evolution of the law of privacy in response to the computer
revolution, it would be instructive to consider a statement by
Professor Arthur Miller during a recent symposium on the computer
and privacy:
The computer is a many-splendored animal. It is myopic to think of it
as little more than a high speed calculator with a gland condition. It's much
more than that. Modern information transfer technology in time will prove
to be the heart of a new communications network, a communications network
that differs from many of the communication networks that we are familiar
with, such as telephones, telegraph, radio, television and newspapers, only in
technological and media terms. Accordingly, the computer must be dealt with
as a communications network.
In short, I am suggesting that we are dealing with a problem of immense
importance . . . . [G]iven the large stakes, we should not think simply in
terms of the ethical or moral implications of a National Data Center, or any
other type of a data center. We must recognize that we are dealing with a
new technology, whose applications are just beginning to be perceived and
whose capacity to deprive us of our privacy simply cannot be measured in
32. This might prove true whether the companies are service bureaus, information services,
or some other type of computer service company.
33. Early manifestations of the theory of strict liability are shown in Huthringer v. Moore,
31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948); Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582 (1868) (percolation of filthy
water); Cahill v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324 (1872) (underground water tunnel). For an example
of statutory extension of this principle, see the relevant portions of the Federal Safety
Applicance Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-60 (1964).
34. See, for example, situations 1,2, and 3, text at 497.
35. See, for example, situation 4, text at 497-98.
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terms of existing systems or assumptions about the immutability of the
technology.?

It is apparent that the legal protection given to the right of
privacy is far from static and may, within the reasonably foreseeable

future, undergo marked changes. However, except insofar as the
changes may be founded upon federal constitutional doctrines, the

developing principles may vary markedly from state to state because
the basic law involved will be state, not federal, law. 37 For the
computer service company, this could mean facing different

standards of liability in fifty different jurisdictions for the
unauthorized disclosure of information-an unhappy prospect for

companies who do a national or regional business.
At present, there is no body of federal law governing privacy
which might "preempt" state law as applied to computer systems.
After receiving the many detailed and thoughtful comments in its
Computer Inquiry and the analysis of the responses prepared by the

Stanford Research Institute, as well as the Institute's own
recommendations, the FCC has decided that it must await the
collection of additional information before deciding whether to
exercise its regulatory authority in the area of privacy and security
of data during transmission and storage.
36. Symposium: Computers. Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REv. 211,
225-27 (1967). The growing concern over protecting privacy in our era of technological
explosion is evidenced by the fact that most of the May-June 1969 issue of THINK, the very
informative magazine published by IBM, is devoted to a special report on privacy. The articles
include Miller, Psychological Testing: Can We Minimize the Perilh, THINK, May-June 1969,
at 24; Ruggles, How a Data Bank Might Operate, id. at 22; Westin, Life, Liberty, and
the Pursuit of Privacy. id. at 12; Westin, New Lines Will Protect Your Privacy, id. at
27. Professor Westin's concluding remarks in his first article are especially illuminating:
"American Society now seems ready to face the impact of science on privacy. Failure to do
so would be to leave the foundations of our free society in peril." Westin, Life, Liberty. and
the Pursuit of Privacy. id. at 21. In his second article, Professor Westin points out that
many organizers of private data banks, in growing recognition of the privacy problem
presented by the computer revolution, are establishing administrative controls to assure the
protection of privacy. Westin, New Laws Will Protect Your Privacy. id. at 31.
37. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which laid to rest the notion that there
is any generally applicable federal common law to be applied by the federal courts in
considering "general" issues in diversity cases. For a more thorough discussion of the Erie
line of cases, see I A. J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.318 (2d ed. 1965); Friendly, In Praise
of Erie-And of the New FederalCommon Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383 (1964).
38. Computer Inquiry, Report and Further Notice of Inquiry, 17 F.C.C.2d 587, 592, 16 P
& F RADIO REG. 2d 1505, 1510 (1969); Computer Inquiry, Notice of Proposed Rule Making
and Tentative Decision, 18 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1713, 1718 (1970). The regulatory authority
of the FCC in this area may, of course, be limited in the absence of additional legislation.
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Although it did take a significant step in the privacy area in Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,1'
Congress has not acted decisively in this area. In Title IlI, Congress
(1) outlawed the interception and disclosure of wire or oral
communications, except as specifically authorized in the statute
pursuant to court order;' 0 (2) amended section 605 of the
Communications Act of 1934"1 to take into account the foregoing
addition to the federal criminal code;' 2 and (3) established a
"National Commission for the Review of Federal and State Laws
Relating to Wire Tapping and Electronic Surveillance," which is to
study the entire wiretapping and electronic surveillance situation and
make a final report within seven years 3 One interesting feature of
this act is that it gives a civil cause of action for damages to "any
person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed,
or used in violation of this chapter. .

. .""

Although this provision

for civil damages in Title III will provide a new, and perhaps potent,
remedy to the individual citizen in protecting his privacy, the remedy
reaches only one aspect of the privacy problem in data processing,
and it certainly does not in any way preempt the various provisions
of state law dealing with invasions of privacy. First, the remedy is
limited only to persons whose wire or oral communications" are
intercepted, disclosed, or otherwise used in violation of the act. Thus,
this remedy on its face does not reach the problem of the
unauthorized disclosure of stored information about an individual,
which is not "communicated" by the individual himself to someone
else.' Secondly, it is not entirely clear whether the act's sanctions
39. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (Supp.IV, 1969).
40. Id. §§ 2511,2515-19.
41. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (Supp.IV, 1969).

42. § 803, 82 Stat. 212, 223 (1968) (reprinted infull
following 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (Supp.
IV,1969)).
43. § 804, 82 Stat. 212, 223-25 (1968) (reprinted in full following 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (Supp.

IV,1969)).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (Supp. IV, 1969).

45. As used in the statute, "wire communication" means:
any communication made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the
transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection
between the point of origin and the point of reception furnished or operated by any
person engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the
transmission of interstate or foreign communications. Id. § 2510(1).
An "oral communication" means: "any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting
an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances
justifying such expectation." Id. § 2510(2).
46. See Miller 1201.

Vol. 1970:495]

COMPUTER SELF-REGULATION

505

will even reach the problem of interception of data being transmitted
to or from a data bank, or the disclosure of such data after
interception. The term "intercept," as used in the act, means the
"aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral
communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or
other device."' 7 Query whether transmitted data is subject to such
"aural acquisition," at least in the case of data sent over a special
digital communications network using time division multiplexing
techniques; query whether courts would reach different conclusions
depending upon the technical nature of the communications network
over which the data traveled. s
A RATIONAL SOLUTION: SELF-REGULATION BY THE COMPUTER
INDUSTRY UNDER FEDERAL GOVERNMENTAL AUSPICES

It is estimated that by the late 1970s, the traffic volume over
the nation's telephone network will be about equally divided between
voice and data transmission," representing a far greater use of the
telephone network for data transmission than at present. By 1975
more than 60 percent of the computer hardware used in the United
States will be tied into the public communications system, and
estimates for 1984 have run as high as 90 percent. Thus, we are
on the verge of an explosion in remote access data processing,
including a great number of time-sharing, real-time systems. The
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (Supp. IV, 1969) (emphasis added). It remains to be seen how
the deinition will be interpreted. The legislative history of the Act shows clearly that Congress

was preoccupied with the interception of voice communications, whether by wiretapping or
other electronic devices. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 217-18 (1968). The few

cases that have cited Title III of the Act have all been criminal-cases or civil antitrust cases
closely related to criminal cases and have all dealt with voice communications. See, e.g.,
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 & nn.8-9 (1969); United States v. McCarthy,
292 F. Supp. 937, 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American
Radiator &Standard Sanitary Corp., 291 F. Supp. 247,249-50 (E.D. Pa. 1968); United States
v. Schipani, 289 F. Supp. 43, 60 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); United States v. American Radiator
Standard Sanitary Corp., 288 F. Supp. 701,706-07 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
48. For example, the courts might arguably distinguish between interception of data
transmitted by the regular analog telephone network and that carried over a special digital
network. See generally Miller 1206.
49. See Chancy, Data Transmission Basics, COMMUNICATIONS, Mar. 1969, at 27; cf. Irwin,
Computers and Communications: The Economics of Interdependence, 34 LAw & CONTEMP.
PRon. 360,361 (1969).
50. Note, Computer Services and the FederalRegulation of Communications, 116 U. PA.
L. REv. 328 (1967).
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trends in the law discussed above51 may well be accelerated by the
quickening pace of technological progress.
The choice lies with the computer industry. It can go along and
let events unfold in an unstructured, haphazard manner and thereby
permit others to fashion for it the basic standards and rules
governing the conduct of its business, or it can itself initiate rational
means to control its own destiny and at the same time serve the
public interest by assuring privacy and security of data, in both
transmission and storage. In an industry whose whole thrust is to
bring rational order out of the potential chaos unleashed by the
information explosion, the choice seems clear: Working from the
foundations already laid, the computer industry should pull together,
develop, and then enforce standards of construction and operation
for computer systems which process data of such a nature that
privacy or security are necessitated.
Before detailing the mechanics of this proposal it would be well
to point out what is not being proposed. The regulation
contemplated would not deal with such matters as the rates or prices
to be charged by computer service companies, the rate of return they
should earn, the terms and conditions of their sales to their
customers, or other matters relating to traditional economic or rate
regulation.5 2 Rather, the industry, under federal governmental
auspices, would develop standards to assure that computer systems
will incorporate a reasonable degree of privacy protection and will
be operated to achieve the desired degree of privacy and security of
data necessary in any given circumstance.53
Any program of self-regulation should include at least the
following features:
1. The program should be specifically authorized and
established by federal statute, a prerequisite which would avoid the
antitrust problems that inevitably arise where competitors or
51. See notes 13-37 supra and accompanying text.
52. The respondents to the FCC's Computer Inquiry, including the Department of Justice,

generally agreed that the computer service industry should be permitted to develop in the free
competitive economy, and not as a regulated utility. See L. KRAUSE, Analysis of Policy Issues
in the Responses to the FCC Computer Inquiry, STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, REPORT
No. 7379B-2, at 22-26 (1969). The author agrees. For a thorough discussion of the issues
involved, see S. MATHISON & P. WALKER, COMPUTERS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS: IssuEs IN
PUBLIC POLICY 16-19 (1970). The FCC, as of this time, agrees. See Computer Inquiry,
Tentative Decision, 1718-22.
53. These standards should be defined to the greatest extent possible.
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potential competitors associate to formulate industry standards.4
Indeed, the statute should grant a specific antitrust exemption for

activities within its scope.
2.

Because the program is one of self-regulation, some statutory

mechanism should be established to permit governmental
administrative review of regulatory standards, upon the complaint of

interested persons, before they become effeqtive. Such a mechanism
would provide customers and potential customers of the computer
service industry, as well as private individuals, with an opportunity

to express their views on proposed standardses
3.

An organization composed of representatives of the

computer industry should be established to promulgate and enforce
the desired standards. Such an agency should be specifically

recognized and granted authoritative powers by federal statute, and
its decisions in promulgating standards and in supervising the
operations of the computer service industry should be final, though
subject to specific types of review by an appropriate government
administrative agency"6 and, ultimately, limited judicial review5

4. The industry agency charged with promulgation and
enforcement should have the power of periodic inspection to assure
54. For a discussion of the limitation imposed by the federal antitrust laws on schemes of
self-regulation within an industry, see Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341
(1963), where the Court cautioned that such schemes will be closely scrutinized because of their
potential effect on competition within the industry. See generally G. LAMB & S. KrrrELLE,
TRADE ASSOCIATION LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 11.1-.9 (1956); Baum, Self-Regulation and

Antitrust: Suppression of Deceptive Advertising by the Publishing Media, 12 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 289 (1961); Rockefeller, Industry Efforts at Self-regulation. 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 555
(1965); Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1005, 1159-63
(1967).
55. Such a procedure would afford roughly the same right to comment as is now granted
by section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Supp. IV, 1969), which
provides for the filing of written comments, after appropriate notice, in the case of
administrative agency rule making.
56. The author has deliberately refrained at this time from suggesting what government
agency should undertake this function. The FCC, with its broad expertise in the
communications field, might be the most logical candidate. Perhaps a new agency under the
Department of Commerce might best do the job. In any event, the Congress, in selecting or
creating the agency to do the job, should take meticulous care to assure that the agency and
the whole regulatory scheme will work in tandem with a well defined national communications
policy, as well as in furtherance of national policy in the privacy area. See generally Miller
1236-39.
57. Cf. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963), where the Court utilized
the federal antitrust laws as a basis for its review of the procedural integrity of a system of
industrial self-regulation.
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compliance with standards regarding the privacy and security of
data.
5. The agency should have specific power at least to conciliate
disputes between customers and computer service companies and
between individual citizens and computer service companies, arising
from, or related to, the standards formulated by the industry
agency. 5 Perhaps such conciliation can be made a condition
precedent to the bringing of any lawsuit involving the standards or
application of the standards. 5 '
6. The industry agency should, under guidelines set forth in the
federal statute, establish a licensing or certification system for
computer systems which will handle information about individual
citizens or proprietary data belonging to persons or companies other
than the computer system operator. Before any such computer
system is permitted to commence operation, it should be required to
obtain a license certifying that the industry standards for the
protection of privacy and security of data have been met. Such
standards should cover not only the technical aspects of the
computer system, but also the qualifications of key personnel having
access to the system. In connection with the licensing procedure, the
applicant should be required to show that it has developed, and will
use, appropriate procedures to comply with the standards and to
assure that its key employees comply with the industry's code of
conduct. As noted above, after initial licensing the industry's agency
should have continuing inspection powers to assure that the licensee
complies with industry standards. Again, both in connection with
initial licensing and any subsequent industry proceeding brought to
enforce compliance with standards, there should be review by the
concerned governmental agency and, ultimately, limited judicial
review. In the event of proposed major alterations in the system, a
system licensee should be required to go through a new licensing
procedure.
7. The industry agency should have power to promulgate and
58. It may be appropriate to provide for binding arbitration of such disputes instead of
merely conciliation. This would be feasible, however, only if the industry agency were a truly

independent authority and had such status and reputation for objectivity that nonmembers of
the computer service industry would regard it as a fair tribunal.

59. See generally W. GELLHORN & C. BYsE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 649-51 (4th ed. 1960).
For a discussion of the utility of the conciliation process in an analogous context, see 1968
DUKE L.J. 1000 (conciliation procedure in an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
proceeding).
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enforce a code of conduct for programmers and other key personnel
working with computer systems to which industry standards apply.
Sanctions would be imposed upon individuals violating the code of
conduct, subject, of course, to administrative review by a
government agency and, ultimately, limited judicial review. Such
sanctions might include the imposition of fines, with the maximum
fixed by statute, suspension from employment, and, in the case of
the most flagrant violations, even complete expulsion from the
computer servici industry."
8. The federal authorizing statute should specifically provide
that industry standards will be recognized and given full force and
effect in all judicial proceedings, both state and federal. In fact, the
statute should provide that, in the absence of an express agreement
to the contrary between a computer service company and its
customer, the company will not be liable for any loss or destruction
of data, or "leakage" of data to unauthorized persons, if the
company's computer system has been duly licensed and certified to
be in compliance with the industry association's standards, and if in
fact the system was in compliance with such standards at the time
of the loss, destruction, or unauthorized disclosure. This same
exemption from liability should apply in the case of a claim against
the computer service company by an individual on account of
unauthorized disclosure of data about such individual!'
The preceding framework is necessarily a very broad-brush
treatment of a highly complex subject. However, if the idea of selfregulation is accepted and adopted by the computer industry, the
foregoing guidelines can be a point of departure in constructing the
60. Theft of a computer program might be ground for such expulsion. In at least one case,

a court has held that computer programs are "property" subject to "theft" under state law,
and an employee of a computer company who stole such programs was guilty of felony theft.
Hancock v. State, 402 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966).
61. To reiterate, there should be no statutory exemption from liability in the case of

voluntary and deliberate acts by the computer service company including companies offering
computerized information services. At least as this author now envisions the proposed industry

association, it would not deal with criteria for the voluntary release of information to
"interested persons," government agencies, or other individuals, groups, or organizations. It
may well be that, as the system develops and considerable experience is gained with the

arrangement proposed in this article, it will eventually be appropriate for the industry
association to promulgate standards governing the voluntary disclosure of information. Of

course, to be really effective, especially against the federal government itself, the association
should have specific federal statutory authority to promulgate and enforce such standards, and
the statute should expressly make them applicable to government agencies.
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system. What is needed is a broad consensus within the industry as
to the route to be followed, which can then be translated into
concrete legislation and a detailed plan of operation.
On the technical side, considerable effort over the past few years
has been devoted to developing and improving hardware and
software techniques for assuring privacy and security of data during
both transmission and storage 2 In addition, many of the comments
filed in the FCC's Computer Inquiry described various techniques
used to assure privacy in remote access data processing
applications - Thus there is a readily available body of recorded
experience and thoughtful comment upon which the standards
makers could draw in beginning their complex task.
One aspect of the foregoing proposal for self-regulation must be
given special attention. In the case of remote access data processing,
the communications links between the remote terminals and the
computers must be considered a part of the computer "system" to
be licensed or certified if there is to be really effective privacy
protection. Yet, in virtually all instances, the communications links
will be furnished by common carriers not related to the computer
service company seeking the license or certification Thus neither
the computer company nor the industry agency proposed above will
have control over the degree of privacy protection afforded by a very
important link in the computer "system" to be licensed or certified.
The solution to this problem does not rest in making the
communications common carriers subject to regulation by the
industry agency proposed in this article. Any regulatory scheme
which subjects a company to regulation directly by its customers
62. For example, three excellent papers summarizing some of the problems involved in
achieving privacy and security of data in multi-programmed computer systems were presented
at the 1967 Spring Joint Computer Conference. PROCEEDINGS, SPRING JOINT COMPUTER
CONFERENCE 279-90 (1967). The individual articles were Peters, Security Considerations In a
Multi-ProgrammedComputer System, id. at 283; Ware, Security and Privacy in Computer
Systems, id. at 279; Ware, Security and Privacy: Similarities and Differences, Id. at 287.
The terms "security" and "privacy" are used in special senses in those papers, as summarized
by Willis Ware in the last-cited paper: "For the purposes of this paper we will use the term
'security' when speaking about computer systems which handle classified defense information
which nonetheless must be protected because it is in some respect sensitive." Id. The term
"security" has been used in a broader serise throughout this article.
63. See, e.g., Response of United States Department of Justice (Mar. 5, 1968), filed in
Computer Inquiry, FCC Docket No. 16,979.
64. See Irwin, supra note 49, at 360-61 (1969); Miller 1099-1103.
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must be viewed with at least a healthy skepticism. Thus the
communications common carriers should not be subject to
regulation by the computer industry agency insofar as these carriers
provide communications services in connection with remote access
data processing. 5 Moreover, any such attempted regulation of the
communications activities of the communications common carriers
by the computer industry 'agency might well conflict with existing
regulation by the FCC on the national level and by public service
commissions on the state level.
Rather, the solution to the problem would appear to lie in a wellorganized system of cooperation between the communications
carriers and the computer industry agency, with regulatory
assistance from the FCC as required. There should be a continuing
formalized liaison between the communications carriers and the
computer industry agency, perhaps in the form of one or more
representatives of the communications industry working full time in
the liaison activity. Such liaison could function effectively in at least
two types of situations: (1) when the industry association is
formulating privacy protection standards, it should consult closely
with the communications industry to assure that tariffed offerings
affording the desired degrees of privacy protection in various
situations will be available to the computer service industry; (2) if
communications problems arise in connection with any particular
licensing proceeding under the above proposal, the suggested liaison
could help to resolve the problem, possibly through inducing the
carrier involved to make a new tariff offering or to amend an
existing tariff offering.
Of course, if the liaison activity should fail to resolve any really
significant problem, recourse could be had to the FCC or the
appropriate state public service commission. To ensure that the FCC
will be able to act effectively and expeditiously, the federal statute
authorizing the system of industry self-regulation should expressly
give the FCC whatever additional power that may be necessary.
65. However, if the carriers utilize separate subsidiaries to engage in computer service
operations which would be subject to regulation by the industry association if performed by

computer companies not related to communications common carriers, such carriers or their
computer service subsidiaries should be subject to industry regulation in the privacy area.
66. Even if the FCC might be able to act pursuant to its existing general powers under the
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1964), there may be considerable
advantage in spelling out the FCC's jurisdiction in this situation and perhaps providing for
special streamlined procedures.
If the FCC is to become involved in a significant way in this situation, perhaps it should
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There is presently one highly successful example of industry self-

regulation under federal governmental supervision. For some thirty
years, the National Association of Security Dealers [NASD] has
created and enforced a thorough program of self-regulation for the
securities industry, including member broker-dealer firms and
individual registered representatives. Its principal activities include
the administration of examinations to assure the qualfications of
employees in the securities industry, the promulgation and
enforcement of rules of conduct and fair practice for the securities
industry, and the adjustment of grievances between members and
between members and the public8 One of the most effective tools
in NASD's program of self-regulation is its power to examine the
books and records of member firms to ensure compliance with
NASD rules as well as certain federal regulations. This is equivalent
to the inspection program proposed above for the computer industry.
In addition, NASD operates a program of voluntary arbitration,
both for disputes among its members and for disputbs between the
public and its members. In the case of disputes of the latter variety,
the arbitration panel consists of three members of the public and two
representatives from the securities business. In a member versus
member contest, the panel consists of from three to five
representatives from the securities industry.
Although there are obvious differences between the securities
industry and its problems and the computer industry and its
be the agency to review actions of the computer industry agency although Congress might wish
to consider other alternatives before determining whether to give such jurisdiction to the FCC.
See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
67. This description of the NASD and its activities is taken from the 1968 NASD
President's Report. 1968 NASD ANN. PRESIDENT's REP. Of interest to the computer industry
in formulating its system of self-regulation might be the NASD's statement of purposes:
(1) To promote.

. .

the investment.

. .

and securities business, to standardize its

principles and practices, to promote. . . high standards of commercial honor, and to
.. .promote among members observance of Federal and State securities laws;
(2) To provide a medium through which its membership may . . . consult, and
cooperate with governmental and other agencies in the solution of problems affecting
investors, the public, and [this business]... ;
(3) To adopt. . . and enforce rules of fair practice [in the securities business]...
and in general to promote just and equitable principles of trade for the protection of
investors;
(4) To promote self-discipline among members, and to investigate and adjust
grievances between the public and members. . . . CCH NASD MANUAL 1 1003.
With some slight change in terminology, many of these statements might be substantially
adopted by the computer industry.
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problems, NASD constitutes a valid precedent for the type of selfregulatory industry agency proposed herein. By adopting a NASDtype approach, the computer industry can assure the creation of a
rational and orderly legal framework for resolving the increasingly
pressing problem of privacy in the context of the computer
revolution and, at the same time, assure that regulation will be in
the hands of persons thoroughly cognizant of the complexities of the
situation and the need for protection of individual rights and
proprietary interests in data and programs-all to the benefit of the
public interest.

